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BARNHILL V. JOHNSON AND PAYMENT BY CHECK ON THE EVE OF 
BANKRUPTCY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REAL ESTATE ATTORNEY 
by Lynda L. Butler· 
For parties to a real estate transaction, one of the critical aspects of the transaction is 
the transfer of value between the parties. The success of the transaction - not to mention the 
ability of attorneys to meet their statutory and professional responsibilities - depends on the 
certainty of the transfer of value.l In the 1992 decision Barnhill v. Johnson/ the United States 
Supreme Court clarified that, for purposes of determining whether a debtor made a transfer 
within the 9O-day period prior to bankruptcy, a transfer made by check occurs on the date the 
check is honored and not on the date of delivery or receipt. The Court's decision reverses 
judicial decisions favoring the date of receipf and thus increases the risk of nonpayment at 
least slightly. 
The dispute in Johnson centered around checks that were delivered before but honored 
during the 90-day period preceding the filing of bankruptcy. Under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the trustee for the bankrupt estate may recover transfers of the debtor's property made 
within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing.4 Section 101(54) defines "transfer" broadly to include 
"every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing 
of or parting with property or with an interest in property."s In resisting recovery of the check 
payment, petitioner Barnhill argued that a § 101(54) transfer occurred on the date he received · 
the check, which was outside the 9O-day period. As support, he relied on the breadth of the 
definition of transfer and argued that, at the very least, delivery of a check constituted a 
conditional transfer.6 
·Ms. Butler is a member of the Board of Governors of the Real Property Section of the 
Virginia State Bar and a Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary. 
lFor a discussion of an attorney's obligations under the Virginia Wet Settlement Act, see 
Butler, The Wet Settlement Act and the Problem of Delayed Disbursements, 6 REAL PROPERTY 
SECTION NEWSLETIER 13 (May 1986). 
2112 S.Ct. 1386 (1992). 
3For some examples, see P. ALcES, THE LAw OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS 
§ 6.02[5][b], at 6-24 n.76 (1989). 
411 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(A) (Supp. 1992). 
SId. § 101(54). 
6112 S.Ct. at 1390. 
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In rejecting the petitioner's arguments, the Court focused on principles of commercial 
and bankruptcy law.1 Under commercial law principles, mere "receipt of a check gives the 
recipient no right in the funds held by the bank on the drawer's account. "s "[U]ntil the 
moment of honor the debtor retains full control over disposition of the account and the account 
remains subject to a variety of actions by third parties. ,,9 Numerous events occurring between 
delivery and presentment could result in dishonor.1o Additionally, § 3-409 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code clearly states that a check is not an assignment of any funds available for 
payment.ll While the creditor/payee might have a cause of action against the debtor/drawer 
once the check is delivered/2 this interest could not, in the Court's view, be characterized as 
an interest in the debtor's property, the account with the drawee bank. A § 101(54) transfer of 
part of the debtor's interest in the bank funds would not occur until the date of honor.13 
Nor was the Court persuaded by petitioner's reliance on the accompanying legislative 
history for § 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. That legislative history indicated that "'[p]ayment 
is considered to be made when the check is delivered for purposes of sections 547(c)(1) and 
(2). >1114 In rejecting petitioner's argument, the Court noted that the legislative history applied 
only to § 547(c) and not to § 547(b), the section containing the 90-day preference rule. As 
the Court explained, § 547(c) "establishes various exceptions to § 547(b),s general rule 
permitting recovery of preferential transfers.'115 These exceptions "are designed to encourage 
1The Court examined rights and duties under state commercial law even though the task 
of determining the meaning and timing of transfers is a matter of federal law because the 
Code's definition of "transfer" includes references to "property" and "interest[s] in property." 
In the absence of controlling federal law, property and interests in property are, in the words 
of the Court, "creatures of state law." Id. at 1389. 
SId. at 1390. 
91d. at 1391. 
10ld. at 1390. Examples given by the Court included an account closing, a third-party lien, 
and wrongful dishonor. Id. 
llU.c.C § 3-409(1). In his treatise on fraudulent transactions, Professor Peter Alces prefers 
the § 3-409 rationale, noting that the Court's interpretation of a payee's interests in a check is 
"not a completely accurate view of the commercial paper law." P. ALcEs, supra note 3, at S6-
23 (Supp. No.2, 1992). As he points out, "from the time a payee receives a check, the payee 
has a sufficient interest in it to support a conversion against someone who thereafter takes an 
action inconsistent with the payee's title to the instrument." Id. 
12See 112 S.Ct. at 1390 & n.8. 
131d. at 1390. 
141d. at 1391 (quoting 124 Congo Rec. 32400, 34000 (1978)). 
15112 S.Ct. at 1391. 
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creditors to continue to deal with troubled debtors on normal business terms by obviating any 
worry that a subsequent bankruptcy filing might require the creditor to disgorge as a preference 
an earlier received payment."16 Because of "this specialized purpose," the Court saw no reason 
to apply the legislative history of § 547(c) to § 547(b).17 
The dissenting opinion of Justices Stevens and Blackmun maintained that a § 101(54) 
transfer of property "occurs on the date the check is delivered to the transferee, provided that 
the check is honored within 10 days."ls According to the dissent, this approach is consistent 
with established commercial practicesl9 and with § 101(54)'s broad definition of transfer, which 
includes '''every mode, ... absolute or conditional, ... of ... parting with property."'20 
Further, the dissent stressed that "[n]ormally ... the same terms have the same meaning in 
different sections of the same statute."21 
Because Johnson involved ordinary checks, the implications of the decision for real 
estate transactions involving certified and cashier's checks are unclear. On the one hand, both 
types of checks involve the same timing problem raised by ordinary checks; a gap in time still 
exists between a check's issuance and payment. Further, although the drawee bank is primarily 
liable on certified and cashier's checks,22 the commercial law concept of honor requires more 
than acceptance or primary contract liability. Under 1-201(21) of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, "honor" means "to payor to accept and pay."23 On the other hand, certified and 
cashier's checks arguably give the creditor/payee a claim against the debtor's bank or account 
sufficient to transfer a property interest under § 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code; with a 
certified check this claim arguably arises because the drawee bank has accepted the obligation 
16Id. 
17Id. Although the Court does not address the issue of timing under § 547(c), one possible 
implication of its discussion of the legislative history argument is that the Court would use the 
date of delivery for purposes of § 547(c). 
1SId. at 1392 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
19Id. Commercial practices identified by Stevens include the practice of treating the date 
of delivery as the date of payment when a check is subsequently honored by the drawee bank 
and the tax rule allowing deductions of expenses paid by checks that are delivered by 
December 31 but that are not honored until the next calendar year. [d. 
2°Id. (parts of quoted definition omitted) (quoting § 101(54)). 
21112 S.Ct. at 1393. 
22See U.C.C. § 3-413(1); Butler, supra note 1, at 16-17. For a discussion of the legal 
implications of various methods of remittance, see Alces, Media of Remittance in the Evolving 
Payment System, 12 REAL PROPERTY SECTION NEWSLETTER 14 (Nov. 1991). 
23U.C.C. § 1-201(21). 
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to honor the check as presented,24 and with a cashier's check it arises because the drawee bank 
is also the drawer, a party having direct contract liability on the check.2S In Johnson the Court 
stressed that, n[i]n the absence of any right against the bank or account,n the recipient of a 
check received no interest in the debtor's property until honor of the check.26 Certified and 
cashier's checks arguably give the recipient such a claim against the drawee bank. 
Resolution of the timing issue raised by certified and cashier's checks is important. 
Because real estate closings generally involve one-time payments, they would not otherwise fall 
within the § 547(c)(2) exception for transfers made in the ordinary course of business.27 In any 
event, the Johnson decision makes it clear that the sooner checks are honored, the better. 
24See id. § 3-410(1). 
2SSee id. § 3-413(1). 
26112 S.Ct. at 1391. 
27Mortgage payments made on a long-term basis generally should fall with the ordinary 
course of business exception unless the form of payment suddenly changes. See P. ALCEs, 
supra note 3, § 6.03[2][a], at 6-45 (1989) & S6-36 (Supp. No.2, 1992); see also id. § 6.03[2] 
(1989 & Supp. No.2, 1992) (discussing the ordinary course of business exception). A 
discussion of the implications of § 547(c) for real estate transactions is beyond the scope of 
this article. See generally id. § 6.03 (discussing the § 547(c) exceptions). 
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